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Abstract
A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many
cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the
contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do
not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of
including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies
only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to
each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We
compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the
planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always
at least as large or larger in the second case, and the utility of the firms is
always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in
the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen.
Keywords: Game theory; PERT; Delays; Penalties
1 Introduction
Assume that an agent, which we will call the planner, wants to carry out a project.
The planner could be a public or private organization and the project could be the
construction of some kind of infrastructure such as a bridge or a building. Typically,
the project involves different activities that might be performed by different firms.
Thus, the planner allocates each activity to a different firm. Each firm becomes
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responsible for performing its activity in a specified time. The planner wants to
carry out the project by a deadline and will suffer a cost if the deadline is not met.
We consider that the firms responsible for the activities are not affected directly
by the cost suffered by the planner if the project is delayed. That is because the
cost associated with the delay will be only claimed to the planner. Afterwards,
the planner may indirectly pass on this cost to the firms through penalties in their
payments. For example, the delay in the construction of the temporary centralized
storage of nuclear waste in Villar de Cañas (Spain) means the direct payment of
67000 euros per day to France for the storage of such waste. This amount is directly
paid by the government and not by the firms involved in the construction of the
nuclear waste storage. Thus, the planner should do something to encourage firms to
complete their activities in the agreed time. In practice, the usual way is to impose
a penalty on firms that cause a delay. This point is included in the contract between
the planner and the firm in such a way that when there is a delay caused by the firm
the amount received by the firm decreases in proportion to the delay in the activity.
When the planner is a private organization contracts between the planner and
firms are private. Thus, it is difficult to know how penalty clauses (if any) are
described in them. But when the planner is a public organization it is possible
to learn that information. For instance, Spanish law sets a general framework for
contracts in the public sector1. One part of that general legislation2 describes how
penalties should be applied to firms that cause a delay. The main issues in this area
of Spanish law are outlined below.
First, any project must have a deadline. Firms must complete the project by that
deadline. The administration can also stipulate interim deadlines in some contracts,
in which case the firms must also meet those interim deadlines.
Second, if firms suffer delays (in meeting the project or interim deadlines) for
which they are responsible, then the administration can cancel the contract or impose
penalties on them. We do not consider any delay that arises from unforeseeable causes
beyond the control of the firms such as: fires, floods, strikes, unusual severe weather,
etc. In such a case the deadlines, the final one and the interim ones if any, will be
delayed accordingly. This issue is also reflected in the Public Sector Contracts Law in
the Article 213. The general penalty is applied on a daily basis in a proportion of 0.2e
per 1000e of the total cost estimate for the project. However, the administration
can include different penalties in some contracts. Whenever the penalty reaches a
multiple of 5% of the total cost estimated of the project, the administration must
decide between canceling the project or continuing to apply the penalties.
1We are talking about the “Royal Legislative Decree 3/2011 of 14 November approving the
restated text of the Public Sector Contracts Law”. Ministry of Economy and Finance.
BOE (Spain’s Official State Gazette) number 276. Date: November 16th, 2011. Reference BOE-
A-2011-17887
2VOLUME IV: Effects, compliance and extinction of management contracts.
TITLE I: General rules.
CHAPTER III: Contract enforcement.
Article 212: Defective execution and delay.
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Third, penalties must be applied by deducting them from the total amount that
the firm is to receive from the administration.
In this paper we present a formal model for analyzing situations of this kind.
Our model is inspired by Spanish law, but it could be applied to a wide class of
situations including administrations in other countries. For example, in February
2015 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development updated the General
Conditions for Construction Contracts -Public Housing Programs (Chicago Housing
Authority, 2015). Among these conditions there is a liquidated damages clause that
states: “If the Contractor fails to complete the work within the time specified in
the contract, or any extension, [...] the Contractor shall pay to the Public Housing
Agency as liquidated damages, the sum of $........[Contracting Officer insert amount]
for each day of delay. If different completion dates are specified in the contract for
separate parts or stages of the work, the amount of liquidated damages shall be
assessed on those parts or stages which are delayed.” There are also other clauses
concerning the right of the Public Housing Agency to terminate the Contractor’s
right to proceed with the work due to an excessive delay. This issue has also been
studied in other countries such as Italy, Kuwait and the Republic of the Congo (see,
D’Alpaos et al (2013), Al-Tabtabai et al (1998), and Louzolo-Kimbembe and Mbani
(2013)).
This model could also be applied to the private sector. For example, in its Guide
for Supplementary Conditions the American Institute of Architects suggests includ-
ing a liquidated damages clause in construction contracts in the following terms:
“9.11 The Contractor and the Contractor’s surety, if any, shall be liable for and shall
pay the Owner the sums hereinafter stipulated as liquidated damages, and not as
a penalty, for each calendar day of delay after the date established for Substantial
Completion in the Contract Documents until the Work is substantially complete”
(AIA Document A503-2007).
In this paper the PERT (Project Evaluation Review Technique), see for instance
Malcom et al (1959), is used to model projects. Non-cooperative games in extensive
form are used for modeling the situations faced by the different agents involved in
the project.
In our model we have two kinds of agents: the planner, who wants to complete
a project, and the firms, which are hired by the planner to complete the various
activities involved in the project. Typically, the planner is a public or a private
institution. Our non-cooperative game has three stages.
Stage 1. The planner decides what penalty will be applied to firms in case of
delay. We assume that the penalty is proportional to the delay.
Stage 2. Following the structure of the project, firms decide how much effort
they will devote to their assigned activities. Since we are studying situations in
which firms are responsible for their delays, we assume that they can complete their
allocated activities within the specified time if they devote the resources at their
disposal. Thus, a delay in an activity is deterministic and results from the personal
decision of the firm to devote fewer resources than required. We also assume that
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firms can obtain profit from devoting part of their resources to activities unrelated to
the project and so they will incur in a delay. Thus, firms must find a balance between
the gain that they obtain from defaulting, devoting their resources to outside jobs,
and the penalty that will be imposed on them by the planner.
Stage 3. The planner pays the firms. We assume that the planner receives
a utility from the completion of the project. Once the project is completed the
planner knows what delays there have been in all activities. Each firm receives the
amount agreed for the completion of its activity, minus the penalties applied for
delays in that activity (if any). As in Spanish law, we consider two ways of applying
penalties: First, only when the whole project is delayed, i.e. if a particular activity
is delayed but the whole project is completed on time the planner does not apply
the penalty. Second, the planner applies the penalty to each firm whose allocated
activity is delayed (regardless of whether or not the whole project is delayed).
Actually, we consider two non-cooperative games in which Stages 1 and 2 are the
same but Stage 3 is different. Since the utility of the agents is different in the two
games, the equilibria could be different. In this paper we study and compare the
equilibria in the two cases. Our main findings are the following.
The optimal penalty for the planner depends on the profit obtained by the firms
when devoting their resources to activities other than the project. Thus, under Span-
ish law it is better to set the penalty depending on the project under consideration
than to apply the general penalty. Moreover, the amount of the penalty also depends
on how it is applied (when the whole project is delayed or always), which is not the
case here.
For each project, the utility of each firm when penalties are applied only when
the whole project is delayed is as great or greater than its utility when penalties are
always applied. By contrast, the utility of the planner when penalties are always
applied is as great or greater than its utility when penalties are applied only when
the whole project is delayed.
The delay of the project is unrelated. Sometimes is greater when penalties are
applied only when the whole project is delayed. Sometimes is greater when penalties
are always applied. Assume that there is a set of agents (other than the planner
and the firms) that need the project to be completed. For instance the project could
be the construction of a new hospital, highway, etc. Those agents clearly want the
project to be completed as soon as possible, but in such a situation it is not clear
which penalty system is better.
The paper is organized as follows. The next subsection briefly reviews the lit-
erature related to our paper. Section 2 describes in detail the situations that we
study. Section 3 analyzes the case where the planner applies the penalties only when
the whole project is delayed. Section 4 analyzes the other case, where penalties are
always applied. Section 5 compares the results obtained in the two cases. In Sec-
tion 6 we present some concluding remarks. The proofs of all the results are in an
Appendix (Supplementary Materials).
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1.1 Literature review
As far as we know there are not many papers studying how to manage delays in
projects. These papers appear in journals of operations research, economics, and
engineering. We now briefly review such papers.
We start by mentioning three papers in the economic literature studying situa-
tions closely related with the one considered in this paper. In all of them, as in our
case, there is a planner and one firm (our model is more general because we can have
several firms). The firm has to carry out a project and in case of delay it has to pay
a cost (as in the present paper).
In D’Alpaos et al (2013) the planner includes in the contract a penalty clause for
delays (as in our case). By delaying the project the firm can obtain more information
about it and so reduce its production costs. Thus, the firm should find the optimal
trade-off between the penalty in case of delay and the information obtained. Besides,
the authors also consider the issue of penalty enforcement by including in the model
the court of law, which could be more or less efficient (length of court trials).
In Lewis and Bajari (2014) the planner offers a contract to the firm in which the
payment depends on the completion time (in case of delay the firm receives less).
There is a random shock that affects the completion time of the project. The random
shock occurs during the realization of the project and must be assumed by the firm.
The two papers mentioned above belong to the theory of contracts where the
main goal is the design of self-enforced relational contracts between firms. See, for
instance, Levin (2003) and Doornik (2008) among others.
In Coviello et al (2018) the situation is quite similar to ours. There is a contract
between the firm and the planner but the penalty clause is not completely specified.
This issue is inspired in the Italian law, which is contrary to the Spanish law where
it is completely specified. First the firm decides if it delays the project or not (in
case of delaying it, the firm obtains a benefit). If the firm does not delay the project
the game ends. In case the project is delayed the planner can enforce a penalty or
not. If no penalty is enforced the game ends. Otherwise, the firm can accept the
penalty or not. If the firm accepts the penalty the game ends. If not there is a trial
to decide what penalty is applied.
In the literature on civil engineering, a field in which the contract is canceled in
some countries if the total amount of penalties becomes very high, there are some
papers that seek to find the limit for penalties so that the cancellation date does not
exceed the due date of the project. Cases in point are the papers by Al-Tabtabai et
al (1998) and Louzolo-Kimbembe and Mbani (2013).
Some papers in the economic and operations research literature study the delay
associated with projects from another perspective. The delay of a project generates
a cost that has to be paid by those responsible for the activities that cause the delay.
The main question addressed in this literature is how this cost should be divided
fairly between those responsible for these activities. Although our paper also studies
projects with delays, the approach taken is quite different. Here, we seek to study
mechanisms that incentive firms to behave in the “right” way.
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Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002) propose two rules: The first is based on cost
sharing literature. They associate a cost sharing problem as in Moulin and Shenker
(1992) with each project with delays. Then they study the serial cost sharing rule
of that cost sharing problem. The second rule is based on cooperative games: They
associate a cooperative game with each project with delays, then study the Shapley
value (Shapley (1953)) of that game.
Branzêi et al (2002) propose several rules following two different approaches. In
the first approach they associate a bankruptcy problem with each project with delays
(see, for instance Aumann and Maschler (1985) or the survey by Thomson (2003)).
Then they compute various bankruptcy rules. In the second approach they introduce
more rules defined directly from the project with delays.
Estévez-Fernández et al (2007) associate a new cooperative game with each
project with delays. The core of that cooperative game is studied.
Estévez-Fernández (2012) considers a more general model than in Estévez-Fernández
et al (2007). For instance, the cost function of this paper is more general. A coop-
erative game (different from the one considered in Estévez-Fernández et al (2007))
is associated with each project with delays. The core of that new cooperative game
is studied. For instance, it is proved that the core is non empty.
Other papers in the economics and operations research literature study the prob-
lems of how to give incentives to accelerate the project. We mention two papers.
Agnetis et al (2015) consider a project where the set of activities is partitioned among
a set of agents and each agent decides the effort (cost) he devotes to his activities in
order to shorten its duration. If the project finishes before the deadline a reward will
be offered to the agents according to a given ratio. The authors model this situation
as a static game considering as agent strategies the durations of the activities for
which they are responsible. They study the set of Nash equilibria. In our paper we
do not consider the case of finishing the project before the deadline. Besides, we
model our situation as a dynamic game where each activity know the durations of
the activities that have already finished. Thus, we study the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria. Besides, in Agnetis et al (2015) the planner has no role because the
rewards depend on a given ratio.
Lewis and Bajari (2011) consider a model with a planner and a firm where the
objective of the planner is to design a contract that gives incentives to the firm to
accelerate its completion time.
2 The situations studied
There is a planner (denoted by 0), who wishes to carry out a project involving
several activities that must be completed in a specific order. Some activities can be
performed concurrently while others must be performed sequentially. We consider
that each activity is allocated to a different firm, which is responsible for completing
it. Besides, the firms are not related in any way and so they act independently.
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Each activity has an estimated duration representing the time needed to complete
the activity when the firm devotes all its resources to it. Each firm has agreed with
the planner to complete its activity in the allotted time. The planner has agreed
with each firm on the amount that each firm will receive for completing its activity
on time. The planner obtains a benefit from the completion of the project.
The planner wants to finish the project on time given the durations of the ac-
tivities. If the project finishes before its expected time, there is no benefit. If the
project is delayed the planner suffers a cost which is linear over the total delay in
the project. The firms responsible for the activities are not affected directly if the
project is delayed.
The firms can act strategically by assigning some of their resources to other tasks
unrelated to the project and thus obtaining extra earnings. In this case they will
need more time to complete their activities in the project. For example, assume that
a firm is working on the construction of a house with a crew of ten workers and
its allocated activity has an eight-week deadline. In this case the workers are the
resources of the firm. The roof of a warehouse is broken and needs to be repaired
quickly. If the firm does not take this job now it will lose it. Thus, the firm assigns
five members of the crew to the job of mending the roof for two weeks. The other
five continue to work on the construction of the house. Once the roof is fixed the
five workers return to the house. Since the firm needs a crew of ten workers working
for 8 weeks to complete its activity on time, it will now finish it in 9 weeks3.
We assume that the planner cannot observe how much of their resources firms
devote to their activities. The planner knows the estimated duration of each activity,
ti, and observes its real completion time, denoted by t
′
i (we assume that t
′
i ≥ ti). In
the above example the planner observes that the firm completes the activity in nine
weeks.
In order to avoid strategic behavior by firms, the planner punishes them if they
delay their activities. Before the projects starts, the planner announces a penalty p
per unit of delay that firms must pay. We consider two cases.
1. First, the planner will punish firms that delay their activities only when the
whole project is delayed.
If the project is completed on time each firm i receives ai, even if its activity
was delayed.
If the whole project is delayed, each firm i receives ai − p(t
′
i − ti).
2. Second, penalties are imposed for all activities that are delayed. In this case
each firm i receives ai − p(t
′
i − ti).
We assume that each firm i has a reserve utility ri representing the utility per
unit of time that firm i obtains from reassigning all its resources to an alternative
3Note that only five workers are working on the activity for the first two weeks, which means
that they do the same amount of work as 10 workers working for one week. In weeks 3 to 9 the full
crew is working on the house.
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task unrelated to the project. Thus, if firm i is not punished it obtains ai + rit
∗
i
where t∗i is the number of units of time for which its resources have been assigned to
an alternative task. If it is punished, it obtains ai + rit
∗
i − p (t
′
i − ti).
In the above example t∗i = 1 because the firm assigns five workers during two
weeks, or equivalently ten workers for 1 week. Notice that, in general, t∗i coincides
with t′i − ti (in our case 9− 8).
We define the delay di of firm i as t
′
i − ti. Thus, the previous expressions can be
written with di in the following way: if firm i is not punished it obtains ai + ridi,
otherwise it obtains ai + (ri − p)di.
Remark 1 In order to simplify the notation of the paper we assume that firms decide
how long to delay the activity rather than how much of their resources and time they
will devote to other tasks. Moreover, when no confusion arises we identify the firm
with its allocated activity.
We now introduce other notation used in the paper. Given x = (xi)i∈N and
y = (yi)i∈N we say that x Pareto dominates y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and there exists
j ∈ N such that xj > yj . Given a subset M ⊂ N we denote by xM = (xi)i∈M . Given
a subset S ⊂ RN we define the Pareto boundary of S as
PB(S) = {x ∈ S : there is no y ∈ S such that y Pareto dominates x}.
The procedure described above is modeled as a non-cooperative game in extensive
form. We use the PERT for modeling the project considered.
2.1 Modeling the project: The PERT
The PERT (Project Evaluation and Review Technique) is a well known tool of Oper-
ations Research for managing complex projects where several activities are involved.
A classical reference for PERT is Moder and Phillips (1970). In the PERT model
there is a directed graph G where the arcs are the activities and the nodes denote
the end or the beginning of one or more activities. We denote the set of arcs by
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ N , bi and ei denote the beginning and the ending
node of i respectively. There are two special nodes: node origin, which is the unique
node such that there is no activity ending at that node, and node end, which is the
unique node such that there is no activity beginning at that node. Each activity i
has an estimated duration of ti units of time, planned in an initial schedule.
A path π is a set of consecutive activities from the origin to the end of the project.
We denote by Π the set of all paths in G. The duration of a path π ∈ Π is the sum
of the durations of the activities along this path, i.e. tπ =
∑
i∈π
ti. The PERT time
T is the minimum time needed to complete the project. Thus, T is the duration of
the longest path, namely T = max
π∈Π
tπ. The slack of a path π, denoted by psπ, is the
amount of time the activities in the path can delay without delaying the project.
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Thus, psπ = T − tπ. The slack of an activity i, denoted by asi, is the maximum time
the activity can delay without delaying the project. Thus, asi = min
π∈Π:i∈π
psπ. A path
or an activity is critical if its slack is 0. This means that any delay will produce a
delay in the project.
Given two activities i, j ∈ N we say that i comes before j, and denote it by i ≺ j,
if activity i needs to be performed before activity j can begin. Given an activity
i ∈ N and a path π ∈ Π such that i ∈ π, we denote by Pre(i, π) the set of activities
that precede i in the path π. Analogously, we denote by Suc(i, π) the set of activities
that follow i in π. Formally:
Pre(i, π) = {j ∈ π : j ≺ i} and
Suc(i, π) = {j ∈ π : i ≺ j}.
We denote by Pre(i) the set of activities that need to be performed before ac-
tivity i can begin and Suc(i) denotes the set of activities that need activity i to be
performed before they can start. Formally:
Pre(i) =
⋃
π∈Π:i∈π
Pre(i, π),
Suc(i) =
⋃
π∈Π:i∈π
Suc(i, π).
3 First case: penalties only when the project is
delayed
We model this situation with a non-cooperative game in extensive form with 3 stages.
In the first stage the planner decides the penalty per unit of delay to be paid by firms
when the project is delayed. In the second stage the firms decide how much of their
resources to put on their activities. The greater the resources the shorter the delay.
In the third stage the planner pays the firms and applies the penalties, if any.
As argued in Remark 1, in Stage 2 each firm decides how long to delay its activity.
As laid down in Spanish and US law, if a project is delayed the planner (public
institution) has the right to cancel the contract or to impose a penalty. Typically,
if the delay is short the planner imposes a penalty but if it is long it cancels the
contract. Thus, we assume that there is a maximum level of delay, say Di, such that
if the firm delays more than Di the planner will cancel the contract with the firm.
Thus, the firm will not receive the payment ai. Hence, di ∈ [0, Di]. Note that under
this assumption the project will not be canceled, so we focus on the case where the
project is always completed.
The firms make their decisions following the structure of the project. This issue
can be explained via the following example.
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Example 1 Consider the project given by the following picture.
Figure 1: Example 1
where
activities ti Di ri
a 3 5 0
b 1 5 2
e 1 5 2
Stage 1. The planner announces the penalty p to all the firms involved in the
project.
Stage 2. Firms a and b decide simultaneously how long to delay their activities.
Once firm b has finished, firm e decides its delay. Depending on the decisions of
firms a and b firm e could make its decision after a or simultaneously with a. Assume
that da = 0 and db = 1, so firm e decides at time 2, while firm a is still working.
Nevertheless, if da = 0 and db = 3, then firm a finishes at time 3 and firm b at time
4. Hence firm e decides its delay at time 4 when firm a has already finished.
In general, if activity j ∈ Pre(i), firm i decides after firm j has finished. If
j /∈ Pre(i) and i /∈ Pre(j) anything is possible: i decides after j has finished,
j decides after i has finished, or one of them decides while the other one is still
working.
It is important to state what information is available to a firm when the time
comes to decide its delay. We assume that each firm knows at time t, when it has
to make its decision, which firms have already finished, and what their delays are.
Thus, the information set of a firm i is characterized by a triple (t, S, dS) where t
is the time at which it has to start. Thus, all activities preceding i have already
finished, i.e.
t ∈

 max
π∈Π:i∈π
∑
j∈Pre(i,π)
tj, max
π∈Π:i∈π
∑
j∈Pre(i,π)
(tj +Dj)

 ,
S is the set of activities that have been completed by time t, namely
S =



j ∈ N : max
π∈Π:j∈π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)∪{j}
(tk + dk) ≤ t



,
and dS = (dj)j∈S where dj is the delay of each activity j ∈ S.
10
Given a firm i ∈ N , a strategy for firm i is a map di that assigns to each
information set (t, S, dS) a delay di (t, S, dS) ∈ [0, Di]. When no confusion arises
we write di instead of di (t, S, dS). Besides, we usually write I instead of (t, S, dS).
Given a strategy profile d = (di)i∈N and a path π ∈ Π, we denote by tπ(d) the real
duration of the path π when the delays of the activities are given by d. Analogously,
we denote by T (d) the real duration of the project. Thus,
T (d) = max
π∈Π
tπ(d) = max
π∈Π
∑
i∈π
(ti + di).
In this expression di stands also for the real delay of activity i when firms play
according with the strategy profile d. When no confusion arises, we will make the
same abuse of notation in the rest of the paper.
Remark 2 We assume that T (D) > T . Namely, if all activities are delayed as long
as possible then the project will be delayed for sure.
We now describe Stage 3, where the planner pays the firms.
• The firms. The utility obtained by firm i will be the amount received from the
planner, plus the utility the firm obtains from the alternative tasks, minus the
penalty caused by its delay (if the whole project is delayed). Formally,
ui(p, d) =
{
ai + ridi if T (d) ≤ T
ai + ridi − pdi if T (d) > T.
• Planner. The utility of the planner will be the benefits obtained from the
completion of the project, plus (if the project is delayed) the amount obtained
from the penalties minus the cost associated with the delay.
u0(p, d) =
{
a0 if T (d) ≤ T
a0 +
∑
i∈N
pdi − c(T (d)− T ) if T (d) > t.
Remark 3 The utility function can be simplified. Since we are assuming that the
project is completed, the planner always obtains a0 and each firm i always receives
ai. Thus, the utility function can be defined in terms of earnings with respect to the
status quo (ai)i∈N∪0.
We now present the formal definition of the non-cooperative PERT game taking
into account the above comments.
A PERT problem with delays is a tuple (G, c, r,D) where G is the graph
associated with the PERT problem, c is the cost per unit of time that the planner
will incur if the project is delayed, r = (ri)i∈N is the vector of reserve utilities of the
firms, and D = (Di)i∈N is the vector of maximum levels of delay of the firms.
We can associate a non-cooperative game Γ(G, c, r,D) with each PERT problem
with delays as above, where:
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1. Stage 1. The planner decides the penalty p ∈ [0,+∞).
2. Stage 2. The firms, following the structure of the project, decide the vector
of delays d = (di)i∈N .
3. Stage 3. The planner pays the firms. Because of Remark 3 the utilities are:
ui(p, d) =







0 if i = 0 and T (d) ≤ T
ridi if i ∈ N and T (d) ≤ T
∑
i∈N
pdi − c(T (d)− T ) if i = 0 and T (d) > T
(ri − p) di if i ∈ N and T (d) > T.
Assume that in Example 1, c = 3, ra = 0, rb = 1 and re = 2. Besides, agents
play the following strategies p = 1, da = 0, db = 5 and de = 1. There are two paths
from the origin to the end: {a} and {b, e}. The real duration of the paths when
agents play (p, d) are t{a}(d) = 3 and t{be}(d) = 8. Thus, the real duration of the
project according with (p, d) is T (d) = max {3, 8} = 8. Namely, the project has been
delayed because T = 3. Then,
u0(p, d) = 1 (5 + 1)− 3 (8− 3) = −9
ua(p, d) = 0
ub(p, d) = (1− 1)5 = 0
ue(p, d) = (2− 1) 2 = 2.
Since p = rb, firm b obtains the same utility delaying its activity 5 units than
finishing on time.
Remark 4 Assume that ri = p for some firm i ∈ N . Assume that the whole project
is delayed. This means that firm i will obtain zero whatever its delay. We assume
that in such cases, firm i prefers not to delay. This can be interpreted as a reputation
effect. Planners do not like delays and if a firm does not produce delays its reputation
will be better and it will be easier for it to obtain contracts in the future. Thus, we
consider that a firm will cause a delay only if it improves its utility by doing so.
Next we study our model in three different examples: in the first all the activities
perform in line; in the second all the activities perform in parallel; and in the third
we propose a mixture of the two cases (a slight modification of Example 1).
Example 2 Consider a project where all the activities are in line.
Figure 2: Example 2
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Since the unique path is the critical one, a delay in one activity will turn into a
delay in the whole project. For each p and each i ∈ N , the utility of firm i will be 0
if it has not delayed and (ri − p) di if it has delayed di. Thus, in any Nash equilibria
(NE) of the game if ri < p, firm i chooses di = 0. If ri > p, firm i chooses di = Di.
If ri = p, by Remark 4, firm i chooses di = 0.
Thus, for each p the utility of the planner will be (p− c)
∑
i∈N :ri>p
Di. So in an NE
the planner chooses the penalty p that maximizes the above expression. If p ≥ c, the
planner will always obtain a non negative utility. If the reserve utilities are not so
small (for instance ri > c for some i) then the planner will choose p ≥ c.
This example shows that in equilibrium the planner could possibly choose a
penalty greater than the cost, which is quite intuitive. Nevertheless, it is also pos-
sible that in equilibrium the project could be delayed. This is not counterintuitive.
Assume that the cost c of delaying the project is smaller than the reserve utilities of
the firms and the planner chooses a penalty p larger than c but smaller that some
ri. Thus, firms will decide to delay their activities because the benefits exceed the
penalty. But the planner will also get benefits because the money obtained from the
penalties offsets the loss caused by the delay.
Example 3 Consider a project where the three activities are performed in parallel.
Figure 3: Example 3
Besides c = 2 and
activities ti Di ri
a 3 10 1
b 3 10 1
e 3 10 1
Note that, as in the example above, all activities are critical. Thus, if a firm
delays its activity then the whole project will be delayed.
Assume that agents are playing an NE. If the planner announces a penalty p ≥ 1,
all the activities will be completed on time and the payoff for the planner will be 0.
If the planner announces p = 0.9 all the firms will choose di = Di = 10. Thus, the
payoff of the planner will be 3 · 0.9 · 10− 2 · 10 = 7 > 0.
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Next, we consider an example where some activities are performed in parallel and
others in sequence.
Example 4 Consider the project given by the figure in Example 1 where c = 5 and
activities ti Di ri
a 10 5 0
b 4 5 3
e 4 5 3
If firms play an NE in the subgame obtained in Stage 2, depending on p, we can
obtain several NE4
p 4 2.5 2
(da, db, de) (0, 2, 0) (0, 1, 1) (0, 5, 5)
T (d)− T 0 0 8
(u0, ua, ub, ue) (0, 0, 6, 0) (0, 0, 3, 3) (−20, 0, 5, 5)
In the case p = 4 it is easy to see that the NE obtained in Stage 2 is unique.
Nevertheless, in the case p = 2.5 several NE could exist in the subgame obtained
in Stage 2. For instance (da, db, dc) = (0, 0.9, 1.1) is also an NE inducing no delay
in the project (T (d)− T = 0) and whose payoff vector is (0, 0, 2.7, 3.3). Notice that,
even the payoffs of the firms is different in both cases, the project is not delayed and
so the utility of the planner is the same. Intuitively, what is happening is that firms
b and e are dividing the slack of path {be} among them in different ways. In the case
p = 2 the NE obtained in Stage 2 is also unique.
3.1 Equilibria in Stage 2
In this part we characterize the NE of the subgame of Γ(G, c, r,D) obtained in Stage
2, once the penalty p is announced by the planner. First we introduce some concepts
used in this characterization.
Given a penalty p and a firm i with ri > p, if firm i delays Di its utility will be
at least (ri − p)Di > 0. If ri ≤ p and firm i does not delay its activity, its utility will
certainly be 0. Thus, we define the minimal right utility5 of firm i as
umri (p) =



(ri − p)Di if ri > p
0 if ri ≤ p.
4This statement is a consequence of our results but could be proved now directly.
5The name minimal right is used in reference to the structure of the non-cooperative game, but
not the contract between the planner and the firm.
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Remark 5 This minimal right utility can also be interpreted as maxmin utility.
Namely, for each penalty p and each firm i we define
ummi (p) = max
di
min
d−i
ui (p, di, d−i)
where d−i stands for the strategies of the agents in N \ {i}.
For each i ∈ N , it is easy to see that when the delay of the other firms is enough
to delay the project, namely T
(
0, DN\{i}
)
> T , the minimal right utility and the
maxmin utility coincide (umri (p) = u
mm
i (p)).
Given a penalty p, let si(p) be the minimal right delay, i.e. the minimum time
by which activity i should be delayed when the project is not delayed to obtain its
minimal right utility. Thus,
si(p) =



(ri − p)Di
ri
if ri > p
0 if ri ≤ p.
Notice that si(p) ∈ [0, Di] always. When no confusion arises we will write si
instead of si(p).
Given a penalty p ∈ R such that
∑
i∈π
si(p) ≤ psπ for all π ∈ P , let F (p) be the set
of delays of the activities such that each agent delays at least si(p) units of time and
the project finishes on time. Namely,
F (p) =
{
x ∈ RN : xi ∈ [si(p), Di] and
∑
i∈π
xi ≤ psπ for all π ∈ P
}
.
In the next proposition we characterize the NE in the subgame obtained in Stage
2.
Proposition 1 Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by the PERT
problem with delays (G, c, r,D). Let p be the penalty chosen by the planner at Stage
1. Assume that firms are playing an NE in the subgame obtained in Stage 2.
(1) If there exists a path π′ ∈ Π such that
∑
i∈π′
si(p) > psπ′, then all NE have the
same utility outcome. Besides, the project is delayed under any NE.
(2) If
∑
i∈π
si(p) ≤ psπ for all π ∈ Π, then any allocation in
{
(xiri)i∈N : x ∈ PB(F (p))
}
can be obtained as the utility vector associated with some NE. Thus, there exist equi-
libria in which the project is not delayed.
The proof of Proposition 1 and the other results of the paper are in Appendix
(Supplementary Materials).
In the first part of Proposition 1 we prove that, basically, we have a unique NE.
Nevertheless, in the second part we identify a subset of utility allocations associated
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with NE. Depending on the case there may be NE where the project is delayed or
not. For instance, when p > max
i∈N
ri, there is no NE where the project is delayed.
However, in the next example, we show there are NE that lead to payoffs that are
not associated with any allocation x ∈ PB(F (p)).
Example 5 . Consider the project given by the following figure
Figure 4: Example 5
where
Activities ti Di ri
a 10 3 0
b 2 3 3
e 2 3 3
f 2 8 4
Notice that the value of c is irrelevant for our analysis. Let p = 2. We define d
as follows
• da(I) = 0 for every information set I.
• db(I) = 1 for every information set I.
• de(I) = 2 for every information set I.
• df(I) =
{
4 if t = 4, S = {b, e}, db = 1, and de = 2
8 otherwise.
Thus, ua(p, d) = 0, ub(p, d) = 3, ue (p, d) = 6, and uf(p, d) = 16. Note that under
this strategy the slack of path {b, f} is not completely allocated. It is easy to prove
that d is a NE. For instance, if firm b delays 2, instead of 1, the project still finishes
on time. But if firm b does so, firm f will delay 8 (instead of 4), the project will be
delayed and the utility of firm b will be 2.
Nevertheless, the vector of delays (0, 1, 2, 4) associated with d, does not belong to
PB(F (2)) because (0, 2, 2, 4) Pareto dominates (0, 1, 2, 4) and (0, 2, 2, 4) ∈ F (2).
In the next Proposition we characterize the set of NE whose payoffs for the firms
are not Pareto dominated by other NE. By part 1 of Proposition 1, when there is
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a path π′ ∈ Π such that
∑
i∈π′
si(p) > psπ′ all NE have the same utility outcome. In
such a case the set of NE whose payoffs are not Pareto dominated is the set of all
NE.
Proposition 2 Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Assume that
∑
i∈π
si(p) ≤ psπ for all π ∈ Π. Let d be an NE in the subgame obtained
in Stage 2. Then, the set of NE whose payoffs are not Pareto dominated is:
{(rixi)i∈N : x ∈ PB(F (p))} .
We end this subsection with some examples showing that some NE might not
be a good prediction of the behavior of firms.
Example 6 Consider the project given by Example 3 where c = 5 and
activities ti Di ri
a 3 5 0
b 2 5 1
e 2 5 1
Assume that p = 0.9. Notice that the three firms take their decisions simultane-
ously. Thus, they have only one information set. Since ra = 0 and a is a critical
activity it is a dominant strategy for firm a to finish on time. Thus, if d is an NE
in the subgame in Stage 2 then da = 0.
There are two NE in the subgame in Stage 2 d = (0, 1, 1) and d′ = (0, 5, 5). In
the first NE firms b and e delay by 1 unit, the project finishes on time, and each
firm (b and e) obtains 1. In the second NE firms b and e delay as long as possible,
the project is delayed and each firm (b and e) obtains (1− 0.9) 5 = 0.5. Notice that
the second NE is Pareto dominated, in terms of the utilities of the firms, by the first
one.
The second NE is based on a bad coordination effect. Firm b (or e) thinks that
firm e (or b) will delay as long as possible, so its best option is to do likewise.
Nevertheless, it is better for both firms to delay by only 1 unit (as the first NE
suggests).
This bad coordination effect is intrinsic to the NE when agents play simultane-
ously. We believe that in this example the first NE predicts the behavior of rational
firms better.
Example 7 Assume that in Example 1 p = 1.9. Thus sb(p) = se(p) = 0.25. Because
of Proposition 2, the set of utilities associated with undominated NE is
{(0, x, 2− x) : x ∈ [0.5, 1.5]} .
Take (0, 0.6, 1.4). This corresponds to da = 0, db = 0.3, and de(I) = 0.7 for any
information set I of firm e. We do not believe that this NE predicts the behavior of
rational firms.
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We now analyze this example in detail. Firms a and b must make their decisions
simultaneously and the only information that they have is p = 1.9. Firm e knows
the delay of firm b. Firm e may know the delay of firm a (for instance if db = 4
and da = 0) but it also may not (for instance if db = 1 and da = 0). What should
firm e do in any of its information sets? Of course, if the project is delayed the best
decision for firm e is to play de = 5(= De). We consider several cases:
1. Assume that db > 1, then the project will be delayed. Hence, the best decision
for firm e is de = 5 and its final payoff will be (2− 1.9) 5 = 0.5.
2. Assume that 0.75 < db ≤ 1. Two situations are possible depending on the delay
of firm a (which firm e does not know).
(a) da > 0. Then the project will be delayed and hence the best decision for
firm e is de = 5. Its final payoff will be 0.5.
(b) da = 0. If firm e chooses de > 1 − db the project will be delayed. In that
case it is better to choose de = 5. Hence, the project will be delayed and
the utility of firm e will be 0.5.
If firm e chooses de ≤ 1− db the project will finish on time. The utility of
firm e will be 2 (1− db) < 2 (0.25) = 0.5.
Thus, the best decision for firm e is to choose de = 5.
3. Assume that db ≤ 0.75. Again, two situations are possible depending on the
delay of firm a (which firm e does not know).
(a) da > 0. Similarly to Case 2.(a), de = 5 and firm e obtains 0.5.
(b) da = 0. If firm e chooses de > 1− db similarly to case 2.(b), de = 0.5 and
firm e obtains 0.5.
If firm e chooses de ≤ 1 − db the project will finish on time. In that
case it is better to choose de = 1 − db. Then the utility of firm e will be
2(1− db) ≥ 2(0.25) = 0.5.
Notice that the best decision for firm e depends on the decision of firm a. If
da > 0 then the best decision is de = 5, but if da = 0 the best decision is
de = 1 − db. Thus, firm e should think about what firm a will do and make
its decision accordingly. This case is quite simple because for firm a the payoff
from playing da = 0 is larger than the payoff of any da > 0. Hence, firm e will
choose de = 1− db.
We now analyze the behavior of firms a and b. For firm a da = 0 dominates any
da > 0, so firm a will always choose da = 0 under equilibria.
Firm b may anticipate that firm a will choose da = 0 and firm e will choose de
following the discussion above. If firm b chooses db > 0.75, then firm e will choose
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de = 5, and firm b will obtain (2 − 1.9)db ≤ 0.5. If firm b chooses db ≤ 0.75, then
firm e will choose de = 1− db and firm b will obtain 2db. Thus, the best decision for
firm b is db = 0.75.
We argue that although there are many NE in this example, rational firms will
play the NE where in the equilibrium path, da = 0, db = 0.75, and de = 0.25, whose
vector of utilities for the firms is (0, 1.5, 0.5).
Both examples 6 and 7 show that when firms make their decisions they must care
about what decisions are made by firms that perform in parallel. In both examples
the good prediction is that of the case where firms believe that firms working in
parallel will not cause a delay unless it is profitable for them.
We will consider that when it is the time for a firm to decide its strategy, it
will act rationally according to its optimistic believes about the performance of the
activities that are currently running and the ones that have not yet started. Under
this assumption, this activity observes the delay of the already finished activities; for
the activities that have not yet started it will assume that they will delay at most
its minimal right and; finally for the activities that are performing in parallel it will
assume they will not delay the project unless it is profitable for them. For example,
in case the available slack, considering the believes, is not sufficient to ensure its
minimal right. In the next section we formalize this idea and select the NE that
meet this condition.
3.2 Selecting equilibria in Stage 2
In this section we define the optimistic NE. Our idea is to select the NE where
each firm behaves rationally in any information set when its beliefs are optimistic,
i.e. when each firm thinks that the other firms will not delay the project unless
it is profitable for them. Thus, we select the NE that meet two conditions. The
first condition is related with the beliefs of the firms. By the time when a firm i
must make its decision there are other firms that have already made their decisions
(firm b in Example 1 with i = e); there are also other firms that will make their
decisions after firm i has completed its work (firm e in Example 1 if we consider
i = b); and still others that make their decisions while firm i is still performing and
therefore do not know the final delay of firm i (firm a in Example 1 with i = b). In
an optimistic NE we assume that firm i believes that the firms in the third group
will not cause a delay unnecessarily (namely, these firms are trying to play an NE
without delay when possible). The second condition is related to the ideas of the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We assume that each firm behaves
rationally in any information set in accordance with its beliefs. In our case this
assumption is stronger than saying that agents play an SPNE because, in general,
the unique subgame of the subgame obtained in Stage 2 is the whole subgame (see
for instance examples 6 and 7).
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We now formalize this idea. Consider i ∈ N and I = (t, S, (dj)j∈S) an information
set of firm i. Let Par(I) be the set of activities that perform in parallel with i at
time t6. Namely,
Par(I) = {k ∈ N \ S : Pre(k) ⊂ S}.
Note that i ∈ Par(I).
We now define the vector of optimistic believes o(I) ∈ RN for firm i at
information set I. We consider several cases:
1. j ∈ S. Firm i knows the exact delay dj of firm j. Thus,
oj(I) = dj .
2. j ∈ Par(I)\ {i}. Firm i knows that firm j has started at time max
j∈π∈Π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)
(tk + dk)
and that at time t firm j is still working. Thus, firm j has been working
t− max
j∈π∈Π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)
(tk + dk) units of time.
Firm i believes firm j will not delay the project unless it is necessary for ob-
taining its minimal right. Thus, if t − max
j∈π∈Π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)
(tk + dk) < tj + sj(p),
then firm i believes the delay of firm j will be sj(p). Otherwise, if t −
max
j∈π∈Π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)
(tk + dk) ≥ tj + sj(p), then firm i believes firm j will finish
immediately. We model it by saying that j will finish in ε units of time. Thus,
oj(I) = max



sj(p), t− tj − max
j∈π∈Π
∑
k∈Pre(j,π)
(tk + dk) + ε



.
3. j ∈ N \ {S ∪ Par(I)}. Note that in this case firm i has no information about
the delay of j because it has not started yet. So firm i believes firm j will not
delay the project at least it is necessary for obtaining its minimal right. Thus,
oj(I) = sj(p).
Let a(o(I), ε) = max
π∈Π
{
∑
j∈π
oj(I)− psπ
}
where by convention oi(I) = si(p). If
a(o(I), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0, then the project will be delayed under each NE. If
a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0 it is possible for firms to play an NE without delays.
Remark 6 Given the information held by firm i at time t, firm i thinks that the firms
that have not finished yet, including itself, will choose a delay equal to its minimal
right or will finish immediately. Actually, our results still hold if the beliefs of firm
i are modeled by a vector x(I) in which the firms do not delay the project unless it
is necessary to do so to obtain their minimal right. Namely, xj(I) = oj(I) for all
j ∈ S, xj(I) ≥ oj(I) when j /∈ S, and a(x(I), ε) ≤ 0 when a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0.
6The set of activities in which firms are still performing at time t.
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Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D). Let p be
the penalty chosen by the planner at Stage 1. Consider i ∈ N and I an information
set of agent i. Let x = (xj)j∈N\(Suc(i)∪{i}) such that xj = dj for each j ∈ S. We
define the game ΓI,x(G, c, r,D) as the game induced by Γ(G, c, r,D) at information
set I by assuming that the set of firms is Suc(i) ∪ {i} and the rest of the firms
j ∈ N \ (Suc(i)∪ {i}) have a fixed duration of tj + xj units of time (or a fixed delay
of xj units of time). Note that in this game the first decision corresponds to firm i.
Let us denote by oi(I) the restriction of o(I) to N \ (Suc(i) ∪ {i}), namely,
oi(I) = (oj(I))j∈N\(Suc(i)∪{i}).
We say d = (di)i∈N is an optimistic NE if it is an NE and for any firm i and
any information set I we have that dSuc(i)∪{i} induces an NE in Γ
I,oi(I)(G, c, r,D).
We now compute the set of optimistic NE in Example 1 when p = 1.9. Let
I = (t, S, dS) be an information set of firm e. We consider several cases.
1. t > 2. The project will be delayed for sure. Hence, de(I) = 5.
2. t ≤ 2. Thus, S = {b}, oa(I) = 0 = sa(1.9) and ob(I) = db. Hence,
de(I) =
{
5 if db > 0.75
1− db if db ≤ 0.75.
Let I be the information set of firm a. Since ra < p and a is a critical activity,
da(I) = 0. Note that ob(I) = oe(I) = sb(1.9) = se(1.9) = 0.25.
Let I be the information set of firm b. For each decision db in I, firm b knows the
decision of firm e under an optimistic NE. Hence, db(I) = 0.75.
Thus, the vector of delays when firms play an optimistic NE is (0, 0.75, 0.25) and
the utilities are (0, 1.5, 0.5).
Next we prove that there is a unique optimistic NE.
Proposition 3 Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
For any penalty p there exists a unique optimistic NE in the subgame obtained in
Stage 2.
3.3 Equilibria in the whole game
Once we know how firms behave under equilibria when the planner announces the
penalty, the next step is to focus on the optimal decision for the planner. Our main
objective is to calculate the penalty under which the planner maximizes its utility.
To that end we assume that the firms play an NE in the subgame of Stage 2. In some
cases there is a unique NE but in other cases there can be several NE. Thus, the
planner must predict which NE will be played in Stage 2. The results shown in this
section hold under the assumption that in Stage 2 firms will play any optimal NE
(see Proposition 2). In particular our results also hold when firms play the unique
optimistic NE characterized in Proposition 3.
We start with a preliminary result.
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Proposition 4 Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Assume that for each penalty p firms play an optimal NE in Stage 2. Then, there
exists a limit penalty p∗Γ such that
1. If p < p∗Γ, then the project will be delayed.
2. If p ≥ p∗Γ, then the project will finish on time.
Proposition 5 Let Γ(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Assume that for each penalty p firms play an NE d(p) without delays (when there
exists) and the unique NE with delays when there is not an NE without delays in
Stage 2. Thus, sup {u0(p, d(p)) : p ≥ 0} is achieved for some p ∈ {p
∗
Γ, {rj}j∈N :rj<p∗Γ}.
Proposition 5 has two immediate consequences. From a theoretical point of view,
because of the proof of this proposition, the game Γ(G, c, r,D) may not have NE.
This is because in our result we find conditions in order for the planner to obtain
the supremum of its utility. From a practical point of view we think that our results
can be used for predicting the behavior of rational agents. In our model the penalty
p is a real number. In the real world when agents decide about penalties, prices,
etc. they typically use natural numbers, which are a multiple of a small amount of
money in the relevant currency. For instance, if the currency is the Euros, prices are
given as an amount in Euro cents. If we consider a discrete version of our model
where p and r are natural numbers (interpreted as amounts in cents) the whole game
has NE. This corresponds to the case where the planner chooses p′ − 1 where p′ is
(according to Proposition 5) the value at which sup {u0(p, d(p)) : p ≥ 0} is achieved.
We now illustrate the results of Proposition 5 in some examples.
Example 8 Consider the project given by the following picture
Figure 5: Example 8
where c = 6 and
activities ti Di ri
a 4 4 3
b 5 3 5
e 8 3 4
f 6 4 6
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There are four paths: π1 = {a, e}, π2 = {a, f}, π3 = {b, e}, and π4 = {b, f}. The
PERT time is T = 13 and the vector of slacks of the paths is given by ps = (1, 3, 0, 2).
Besides, the limit penalty for each path is: p1π1 = 2.88, p
1
π2
= 2.5, p1π3 = 5, and
p1π4 = 3.947. This means that a penalty as great or greater than p
∗
Γ = 5 is needed if
the planner wants the project to finish on time.
We have seen in the proof of Proposition 5 that the utility of the planner could be
decomposed in two parts: the amount collected from the penalties (2), and the cost
suffered from the delay of the project (3). We represent both in the following figure
Figure 6: Utility of the planner (penalty reward and delay cost)
The next figure shows the utility (blue line) of the planner.
Figure 7: Utility of the planner (total amount)
Note that the planner must choose a penalty lower than 5 to obtain a positive
payoff. Moreover, the supremum utility is achieved when p left converges to 3. Thus,
the planner should choose a penalty a little lower than but very close to 3.
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We consider Example 3. The utility of the planner is given by
u0 (p, d(p)) =
{
30p− 20 if p < 1
0 if p ≥ 1.
Thus, the supremum is achieved when p left converges to 1. From a practical point
of view the prediction given by our results is that the planner will choose a penalty
a little below 1 and firms will delay by 10 units.
We consider Example 4. In this case p1{b,e} = 2.4 and p
1
{a} = 0. Thus, the utility
of the planner is given by
u0 (p, d(p)) =
{
10p− 40 if p < 2.4
0 if p ≥ 2.4.
Since 10p − 40 < 0 when p < 2.4, it emerges that the supremum is achieved when
p ≥ 2.4. In particular when p = 3 = rb = re. The prediction in this case is that
the planner will choose a penalty larger than 2.4 (for instance 3), firms b and e will
delay together by two units (the slack of the path {b, e}) and the project will finish
on time. It is important to remark that the planner is indifferent between penalties
p ≥ 2.4,but firms are not. For instance
p da(p) db(p) de (p) u0 (p, d(p)) ua (p, d(p)) ub (p, d(p)) ue (p, d(p))
2.5 0 1.5 0.5 0 0 7.5 2.5
3 0 2 0 0 0 10 0
In this case, the larger p is, the best for firm b and the worst for firm e.
4 Second case: penalties are applied to every de-
layed firm
We model this situation with a non-cooperative game in extensive form with 3 stages,
as in the previous case. The first two stages are the same in both games but the
third stage is different. In this case the planner always applies the penalty on paying
the firms, i.e. if a firm incurs a delay it will be always punished (no matter whether
the project is delayed or not). We conduct an analysis similar to the one for the first
case. We first analyze the equilibria in Stage 2 and then we analyze the equilibria of
the whole game. In this case most of the theoretical results are quite straightforward.
We first introduce the model formally. With each PERT problem with delays
(G, c, r,D) we associate the non-cooperative game ∆(G, c, r,D) where
1. Stage 1. The planner decides the penalty p ∈ [0,+∞).
2. Stage 2. The firms, following the structure of the project, decide the vector
of delays d.
24
3. Stage 3. The planner pays the firms.
ui(p, d) =
{ ∑
i∈N
pdi − c(T (d)− T ) if i = 0.
(ri − p)di if i ∈ N.
Assume that in Example 1 c = 3, ra = 0, rb = 2, and re = 3. Moreover, agents
play the following strategies p = 1, da = 0, db = 0.5 and de = 0.5. Then, T (d) = 3.
The project is not delayed because T = 3 but delayed firms are punished anyway:
u0(p, d) = 2 (0.5 + 0.5) = 2
ua(p, d) = 0
ub(p, d) = (2− 1)0.5 = 0.5
ue(p, d) = (3− 1) 0.5 = 1.
4.1 Equilibria in Stage 2
In this section we characterize the set of NE of ∆(G, c, r,D) in the subgame obtained
in Stage 2. Basically, there is a unique NE where firms with ri ≤ p do not delay and
firms with ri > p delay as long as possible (Di).
Proposition 6 Let ∆(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Let p be the penalty chosen by the planner at Stage 1. Let d be such that for any firm
i and any information set I of firm i it holds that
di(I) =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
Di if ri > p.
Thus, d is an NE in the subgame obtained in Stage 2. Moreover, all NE in the
subgame obtained in Stage 2 have the same utility outcome as d.
4.2 Equilibria in the whole game
In this section we analyze the whole game under this new penalty system. We obtain
similar results to the previous case, but without making any kind of assumption as
to the behavior of firms in Stage 2. We only need to assume that firms will play an
NE.
We start with a preliminary result.
Proposition 7 Let ∆(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Assume that for each penalty p firms play an NE in Stage 2. Then, there exists a
limit penalty p∗∆ such that
Lemma 1 1. If p < p∗∆, then the project will be delayed.
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2. If p ≥ p∗∆, then the project will finish on time.
Besides, this penalty belongs to {ri}i∈N and p
∗
∆ ≥ p
∗
Γ.
The main result of this subsection is the following.
Proposition 8 Let ∆(G, c, r,D) be the non-cooperative game induced by (G, c, r,D).
Assume that for each penalty p firms play an NE d(p) in Stage 2. Thus,
sup {u0 (p, d(p)) : p ≥ 0} is achieved for a p ∈ {ri}i∈N .
The statements of Proposition 5 and Proposition 8 seem to be the same, but the
set of values that need to be checked in order to find the supremum differs from one
model to the other. Moreover, the supremum may also be different. Note that in
the present model the value p∗Γ plays no role whereas in the first case it is highly
important. For instance, given a penalty p, if there is a firm i with p∗Γ < p < ri, in
the previous case the project will end on time, while in this case firm i will delay as
long as possible and the project could be delayed.
We clarify this issue with an example.
Consider the project in Example 8. If we compute the utility of the planner
under this second penalty system we obtain the following
Figure 8: Utility of the planner
Note that in this case the supremum is achieved when p = 6, whereas in the
previous case it is achieved when p = 3.
In the first case the utility of the planner is 6 and the delay in the project is also
6. In this case the utility of the planner is 12 and the delay in the project is 1.
In this example it seems better for the planner to apply the second penalty system
because it will obtain greater utility with less delay in the project. This raises the
question of whether this happens in general or only in some cases. In the next section
we compare the two cases.
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5 Comparing both penalty systems
In this section we compare the results obtained from the two penalty systems
(Γ(G, c, r,D) and ∆(G, c, r,D)). We compare the utility of the planner, the util-
ity of the firms and the delay in the project under the two systems. We first study
what happens in Stage 2 and then analyze the whole game.
5.1 Comparing Stage 2
Given a penalty p we compare the equilibria of the subgame obtained in Stage 2 for
both Γ(G, c, r,D) and ∆(G, c, r,D). Since there can be multiple NE for Γ(G, c, r,D),
we assume that firms will play an optimal NE (see Proposition 2). In particular
our results also hold when firms play the unique optimistic NE characterized in
Proposition 3. Our findings are:
1. The utilities of the planner in the two games are unrelated (in some cases utility
is greater in Γ(G, c, r,D) and in other cases in ∆(G, c, r,D)).
2. The utility of the firms is as great or greater in Γ(G, c, r,D).
This statement is quite intuitive because in Γ(G, c, r,D) the penalty is applied
only when the whole project is delayed, whereas in ∆(G, c, r,D) the penalty is
always applied.
3. The delay in the project is as long or longer in ∆(G, c, r,D).
This statement seems a little counterintuitive because penalties are applied
more often in ∆(G, c, r,D) than in Γ(G, c, r,D). Nevertheless, it must be con-
sidered that in Γ(G, c, r,D) firms can delay their activities without being pun-
ished and can achieve the same utility as when they are punished.
The above findings are formally proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Let (G, c, r,D) be a PERT problem with delays and let p be any
penalty.
Let dΓ(p) be as follows. When there exists an NE without delays in Stage 2 of
Γ(G, c, r,D), let dΓ(p) be some of the NE given by Proposition 2. When there is not
an NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D), let dΓ(p) be some of the NE given
by Proposition 1.1.
Let d∆(p) be some of the NE in Stage 2 of ∆(G, c, r,D) given by Proposition 6.
Let uΓ and u∆ denote the utility functions of Γ(G, c, r,D) and ∆(G, c, r,D) re-
spectively.
1. It is possible that uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) > u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)), uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) < u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)), and
uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) = u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)).
2. For each i ∈ N , uΓi (p, d
Γ(p)) ≥ u∆i (p, d
∆(p)).
3. T (dΓ(p)) ≤ T (d∆(p)).
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5.2 Comparing the whole game
We now compare the NE of Γ(G, c, r,D) and ∆(G, c, r,D). Since for Γ(G, c, r,D)
there can be multiple NE in Stage 2, we assume firms will play any optimal NE
(see Proposition 2). In particular our results also hold when firms play the unique
optimistic NE characterized in Proposition 3. Our findings are:
1. The optimal penalty for the planner is as great or greater in ∆(G, c, r,D).
2. The utility of the planner is as great or grater in ∆(G, c, r,D).
3. The utility of the firms is as great or greater in Γ(G, c, r,D).
4. The delay in the project is unrelated.
For each project, the utility of each firm in Γ(G, c, r,D) is as great or greater
than the utility of the firm in ∆(G, c, r,D). Thus, firms clearly prefer Γ(G, c, r,D).
For each project, the utility of the planner in ∆(G, c, r,D) is as great or greater
than the utility of the planner in Γ(G, c, r,D). This theoretical result requires a
little more clarification. Although it may suggest that the planner should always
apply penalties some clarifications are needed. It could be the case that the utility
of the planner is the same in both penalty systems. When the planner is a private
institution this may be irrelevant but when it is a public institution it makes sense for
such a public institution to apply the penalty only when the whole project is delayed
if the utilities of both penalty systems coincide. The reason is that firms are better
off under this penalty system, firms are part of society and the public institution
represents society 7. Thus, for public institutions it makes sense to analyze each
project separately and then decide which penalty system to apply. If the utility of
the planner is strictly greater when penalties are always applied then it should choose
that system, but if the planner obtains the same utility then it should choose the
other since firms will be better off.
Assume that there is a set of agents (other than the planner and the firms) that
need the project to be completed. For instance the project could be the construction
of a new hospital, highway, etc. Those agents clearly want the project to be completed
as soon as possible, but in such a situation it is not clear which penalty system
(Γ(G, c, r,D) or ∆(G, c, r,D)) is better.
The above findings are proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Let (G, c, r,D) be a PERT problem with delays and p any penalty.
Let dΓ(p) be as follows. When there are NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D),
dΓ(p) is some of the NE given by Proposition 2. When there is not an NE without
delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D), dΓ(p) is some of the NE given by Proposition 1.1.
Let d∆(p) be some of the NE in Stage 2 of ∆(G, c, r,D) given by Proposition 6.
7For instance, if firms make more profit they will pay more tax and the funding available to the
public institution will be larger.
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Let uΓ and u∆ denote the utilities functions of Γ(G, c, r,D) and ∆(G, c, r,D)
respectively. Then
1. Given
pΓ = min
{
p : p ∈ arg sup
{
uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) : p ≥ 0
}}
and
p∆ = min
{
p : p ∈ arg sup
{
u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)) : p ≥ 0
}}
.
we have that pΓ ≤ p∆.
2. sup
{
uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) : p ≥ 0
}
≤ sup
{
u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)) : p ≥ 0
}
.
3. For each i ∈ N, uΓi
(
pΓ, dΓ(pΓ)
)
≥ u∆i
(
p∆, d∆(p∆)
)
.
4. It is possible that T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
> T
(
d∆
(
p∆
))
, T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
= T
(
d∆(p∆)
)
, or
T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
< T
(
d∆(p∆)
)
.
6 Concluding Remarks
If we consider the results obtained in the paper, we can conclude that the Spanish
law does not address the problem of delays in the projects in a proper way. Al-
though a penalty clause explicitly appears in the contracts in order to encourage
firms to behave right and not delay their activities, this penalty is a fixed amount
that depends on the total cost estimate of the project. Thus, the planner, the public
administration in this case, can not change the value of the penalty that may be
insufficient to avoid an excessive delay. In comparison the liquidated damages clause
in the General Conditions for Construction Contracts - Public Housing programs or
the clause suggested by the American Institute of Architects do provide the option of
fixing whatever penalty the planner decides, but this penalty can not be excessive. If
that is the case the liquidated damages clause, which is lawful, might be considered
a penalty clause, which is illegal.
There are situations in which a public organization wants to complete a project
and each activity involved in the project is allocated to one firm. That firm outsources
to third parties to complete the various activities in the project. This is standard
practice in the information technology and construction sectors. Such cases can be
included in our model if the planner is considered to be the firm and the public
organization does not explicitly appear in the model. In such a case c is the cost per
unit of delay that the planner must pay to the public organization if the project is
delayed. In these circumstances the public organization cares about the completion
time of the project. Since a delay in the project is unrelated in Γ(G, c, r,D) and
∆(G, c, r,D), it is not clear which penalty system is better for the public organization.
We assume that the planner does not cancel any contracts with any firm because
of excessive delays. Such a situation is quite unusual, at least in the public sector,
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but it sometimes happens. This situation is not covered by our model 8.
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[9] Estévez-Fernández, A. (2012). A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties
and rewards in projects. European Journal of Operational Research 216, 647-
657.
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8 Appendix
We prove the results presented in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1.
(1) We prove that there exists an NE with delay. Let us define the strategy
profile d where for each i ∈ N and each information set I,
di(I) =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
Di if ri > p.
Since psπ′ <
∑
i∈π′
si(p) ≤
∑
i∈π′:ri>p
Di =
∑
i∈π′
di, the project is delayed under d.
Next we prove that d is an NE. Consider i ∈ N and d′i a strategy of agent i. We
distinguish two cases:
1. ri > p. Assume that ui(p, d
′
i, d−i) 6= ui(p, d). Then, there exists an information
set I of agent i which is achieved under (d′i, d−i) such that d
′
i(I) < Di. So,
ui(p, d
′
i, d−i) =
{
rid
′
i(I) if T (d
′
i, d−i) ≤ T
(ri − p)d
′
i(I) if T (d
′
i, d−i) > T.
If T (d′i, d−i) > T, then (ri − p)d
′
i(I) < (ri − p)Di = ui(p, d).
Assume that T (d′i, d−i) ≤ T. Since
∑
j∈π′
sj(p) > psπ′ , i ∈ π
′ and
∑
j∈π′\{i}:rj>p
Dj + d
′
i(I) ≤ psπ′.
Since sj(p) ≤ Dj for each j ∈ π
′\{i} with rj > p, sj(p) = 0 for each j ∈ π
′\{i}
with rj ≤ p and
∑
j∈π′
sj(p) > psπ′ we deduce that d
′
i(I) < si(p). So, rid
′
i(I) <
risi(p) = (ri − p)Di = ui(p, d).
2. ri ≤ p. Since di(I) = 0 for any information set I, the project will be delayed
under (d′i, d−i). Thus,
ui(p, d
′
i, d−i) = (ri − p)d
′
i(I) ≤ 0 = ui(p, d).
Next we prove that the project is delayed under any NE. Assume there exists
an NE d = (di)i∈N where the project finishes on time. Thus,
∑
i∈π
di ≤ psπ for each
π ∈ P . Since
∑
i∈π′
si(p) > psπ′, there exists an agent i ∈ π
′ such that si(p) > di ≥ 0.
Since si(p) > 0, we have that ri > p. Let d
′
i be such that d
′
i(I) = Di for each
information set I of agent i. If firm i deviates and plays d′i instead of di, then
ui(p, d
′
i, d−i) =
{
riDi if T (d
′
i, d−i) ≤ T
(ri − p)Di if T (d
′
i, d−i) > T.
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Thus, ui(p, d
′
i, d−i) ≥ (ri − p)Di = risi (p) > ridi. Since agent i improves by
playing d′i instead of di, d is not a NE, which is a contradiction. Thus, under an
NE, the project will be delayed.
Finally we prove that the utility outcome associated with any NE is unique.
Let d′ be an NE. We identify d′i with the choice of firm i in the information set
achieved when all agents play d′. We have proved that the project is delayed. Thus,
ui (p, d) = (ri − p) d
′
i. If ri < p, then d
′
i = 0 (otherwise agent i improves by playing
0 instead of d′i). If ri = 0 or ri = p, then ui(p, d) = 0 for each d
′
i. By Remark 4,
d′i = 0. If ri > p, then d
′
i = Di (otherwise agent i improves by playing Di instead of
d′i). Notice that the outcome associated with d
′
i coincides with the outcome of the
NE defined at the beginning of the proof. Thus, the utility outcome of the set of
NE is unique.
(2) Given x ∈ PB(F (p)), we define d such that for each i ∈ N and each infor-
mation set I, di(I) = xi. Note that under d, firms allocate the slack in the paths
according to x. Besides, the conditions over x guarantee the project finishes on time.
Thus, ui(p, d) = rixi for each i ∈ N .
We prove that d is an NE. Assume firm i changes its strategy to d′i. We identify
d′i with the choice of firm i in the information set achieved when all agents play
according to (d′i, d−i). We distinguish two cases:
1. d′i < xi. The project finishes on time and
ui (p, d
′
i, d−i) = rid
′
i < rixi = ui(p, d).
2. d′i > xi. Since x ∈ PB(F (p)) and d
′
i ∈ [si(p), Di], there exist π ∈ P such that
∑
j∈π\{i}
xj + d
′
i > psπ. Thus, the project will be delayed and ui (p, d
′
i, d−i) =
(ri − p)d
′
i. We distinguish two cases:
(a) ri ≤ p. In this case
ui (p, d
′
i, d−i) = (ri − p)d
′
i ≤ 0 ≤ ui(p, d).
(b) ri > p. In this case
ui (p, d
′
i, d−i) = (ri − p)d
′
i ≤ (ri − p)Di = risi(p) ≤ rixi = ui(p, d).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let d be an NE where the project is delayed. By part
2 of Proposition 1 we know that there exist NE where the project is not delayed.
Let d′ be one of such NE. Let us denote by y and y′ the vectors of utilities for the
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firms associated with both equilibria respectively. Using arguments similar to those
used in the proof of part 1 of Proposition 1 we can deduce that for each i ∈ N
yi =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
(ri − p)Di if ri > p.
Besides, y′ = (xiri)i∈N where x ∈ PB(F (p)). We now prove that yi ≤ y
′
i for all
i ∈ N. If yi = 0, then it is obvious because ri ≥ 0 and xi ≥ si ≥ 0. If yi = (ri−p)Di,
then yi = (ri − p)Di ≤ risi ≤ rixi = y
′
i.
Note that there exists at least one agent j such that yj 6= y
′
j. Otherwise both
vectors would coincide and, by Remark 4, an agent will choose the strategy that
leads to a smaller delay. Thus, y′ Pareto dominates y.
Let d be an undominated NE. Since the project ends on time under d, the utilities
for the firms under d can be rewritten as (rixi)i∈N where xi ∈ [0, Di] and
∑
i∈π
xi ≤ psπ.
When we define si we have argued that any firm i can obtain, independently of the
strategies of the other agents, a utility risi. Thus, xi ≥ si for all i ∈ N . Hence
x ∈ F (p). Suppose that x /∈ PB(F (p)). Then there exists x′ ∈ F (p) such that
x′ Pareto dominates x. We can assume x′ ∈ PB(F (p)) (otherwise we can consider
x′′ ∈ PB(F (p)) such that x′′ Pareto dominates x′ and proceed with x′′ instead of x′).
Under Proposition 1.2, the allocation (x′iri)i∈N can be obtained as the utility vector
associated with some NE d′. Thus, the vector of utilities associated with the NE d′
Pareto dominates the vector of utilities associated with NE d, contradicting that d
is an undominated NE. Thus, we conclude that x ∈ PB(F (p)).
It only remains to prove that if d is an NE whose vector of utilities is given
by (rixi)i∈N with x ∈ PB(F (p)), then d is an undominated NE. Suppose not.
Then, there exists another NE d′ such that the utilities associated with d′ Pareto
dominates (xiri)i∈N . We can assume that d
′ is an undominated NE (otherwise
we take d′′ an undominated NE that Pareto dominates d′ and we proceed with d′′
instead of d′). The utility vector associated with d′ can be expressed as (rix
′
i)i∈N
with x′ ∈ PB(F (p)). Thus, rix
′
i ≥ rixi for all i ∈ N . If ri = 0, then x
′
i = xi = 0
by Remark 4. Then x′i ≥ xi for each i ∈ N with ri > 0 and there exists j ∈ N with
rj > 0 such that x
′
j > xj . Thus, x
′ Pareto dominates x, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove that there exists at least one optimistic
NE. Let i ∈ N and let I be an information set of firm i. Intuitively, the decision
of firm i is as follows: given its optimistic beliefs, if there is enough slack to give to
every firm its minimal right and ri > 0, then firm i delays as long as possible, giving
the other firms their minimal right. Otherwise firm i delays Di when ri > p and 0
when ri ≤ p. Formally,
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di(I) =









min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
if ri > 0 and a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0 for some ε > 0
Di if ri > p and a (o(I), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0
0 if ri = 0 or ri ≤ p and a (o (I) , ε) > 0 for all ε > 0.
(1)
Notice that when a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0 for some ε > 0 we have that
min
i∈π∈Π



Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)



≥ 0.
Thus, di(I) is well defined.
We now prove that d = (di)i∈N is an optimistic NE. Let i ∈ N and I an
information set of firm i. We assume that ri > 0 (otherwise, by Remark 4, di(I) = 0
is the best decision). Let d′i(I) 6= di(I). By simplicity we write di (d
′
i) instead of di(I)
(d′i(I)). We make an abuse of notation and we identify the utility and strategies in
the games Γ(G, c, r,D) and ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D). We distinguish two cases:
1. d′i > di. Thus, di < Di. We consider two cases:
(a) di = 0. Thus, ri ≤ p and a (o(I), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0. This means that the
project will be delayed under NE. So
ui(dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i) = d
′
i(ri − p) ≤ 0 = ui(dSuc(i)∪{i}).
(b) 0 < di = min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
< Di. Thus, ri > 0 and a(o(I), ε) ≤
0 for some ε > 0.Then, the project is not delayed under d and ui(dSuc(i)∪{i}) =
ridi.
We have that Di > di ≥ oi(p) = si(p). By definition of di, if firm i
increases its delay, the project will be delayed. Thus, ui(dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i) =
(ri − p)d
′
i.
If ri ≤ p, then (ri − p)d
′
i ≤ 0 ≤ ridi. If ri > p, then
(ri − p)d
′
i ≤ (ri − p)Di = risi(p) ≤ ridi.
2. d′i < di. Thus di > 0. We again consider two cases.
(a) di = Di, ri > p and a (o(I), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0. Then, the project is
delayed under d and hence ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i}
)
= (ri − p)Di. Two cases are
possible.
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i. The project is also delayed under dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i. Thus,
ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i
)
= (ri − p) d
′
i < (ri − p)Di.
ii. The project is not delayed under dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i. Since a (o(I), ε) > 0
for all ε > 0 we have that d′i < oi(I) = si(p). Thus,
ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i
)
= rid
′
i < risi(p) = (ri − p)Di.
(b) di = min
i∈π∈P
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
xj
}
, ri > 0 and a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0 for some
ε > 0. Then, the project is not delayed under d and ui(dSuc(i)∪{i}) = ridi.
Since d′i < di we know that the project is not delayed under dSuc(i)∪{i} \d
′
i.
Thus,
ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i} \ d
′
i
)
= rid
′
i < ridi.
We now prove the uniqueness. We will prove that if d is an optimistic NE, then
d coincides with formula (1). Let i ∈ N and I an information set of firm i. If ri = 0,
by Remark 4, di(I) = 0. Thus, we assume ri > 0.
For each i ∈ N let l(I) denote the maximum number of activities in the largest
path from i until the end of the project. Namely,
l(i) = max
i∈π∈Π
{|Suc(i, π)|}.
We prove the uniqueness by backward induction on l(i). Assume that i is an
activity with l(i) = 0. Then, Suc(i) = ∅. Since i is the unique firm in the game
ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D) and d induces an NE in ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D), we deduce that di(I) is
as in formula (1).
Assume now that l(i) = 1. Thus, for each j ∈ Suc(i), l(j) = 0, and so these firms
behave according with d. We consider several cases:
1. a(o(I), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0. Since dSuc(i)∪{i} is an NE in Γ
I,oi(I)(G, c, r,D), the
project is delayed under dSuc(i)∪{i}. Thus, ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i}
)
= (ri − p) di(I). We
again consider two cases:
(a) ri ≤ p. If di(I) > 0, then ui
(
dSuc(i)∪{i}
)
< 0. Since dSuc(i)∪{i} is an NE,
we have that di(I) = 0.
(b) ri > p. Since dSuc(i)∪{i} is an NE, we have that di(I) = Di.
2. a(o(I), ε) ≤ 0 for some ε > 0. Then, dSuc(i)∪{i} could be an NE with or without
delay in ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D). Once i has finished, for each j ∈ Suc(i) it is achieved
the information set Ij. We consider several cases.
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(a) di(I) ≤ min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
. Then, a(o(Ij), ε) ≤ 0 for some
ε > 0 for each j ∈ Suc(i). Since l(j) = 0, for each j ∈ Suc(i), we have
that dj(Ij) is as in formula (1). Thus, the project is not delayed and
hence, ui(dSuc(i)∪{i}) = ridi(I).
In this case di(I) = min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
is strictly better that
any di(I) < min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
.
(b) di(I) > min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
. Then, there exists π′ such that
psπ′ −
∑
j∈π′\{i}
oj(I) < di(I) ≤ Di. Hence, there exists j ∈ Suc(i) such that
a(o(Ij), ε) > 0 for all ε > 0. Since oj(I) = sj(p) and sj(p) = 0 when rj ≤ p
we deduce that rj > p. Since l(j) = 0, dj(I) = Dj (as in formula (1)) and
the project is delayed. Hence, ui(dSuc(i)∪{i}) = (ri − p)di(I). Since d is an
NE, ri > p (otherwise d
′
i(I) = 0 is better than di(I)). Then di(I) = Di is
strictly better than any di(I) < Di.
Since si(p) ≤ min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
we have that
(ri − p)Di = risi(p) ≤ ri min
i∈π∈Π



Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)



.
Now if si(p) < min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
, then firm i obtains more utility
delaying min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
than delaying Di. Since dSuc(i)∪{i} is an
NE in ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D), we have that di (I) = min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
.
If si(p) = min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
then firm i obtains the same utility
delaying min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
than delaying Di. Since dSuc(i)∪{i} is an
NE in ΓI,o
i(I)(G, c, r,D) and Remark 4, we have that di(I) = min
i∈π∈Π
{
Di, psπ −
∑
j∈π\{i}
oj(I)
}
.
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Assume now that l(i) = 2. If we proceed as in the previous case we obtain than
di(I) is as in formula (1). By repeating this argument we can prove that di(I) is as
in formula (1) for each i ∈ N and each information set I of firm i. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let f(p, π) denote the sum of the minimal rights of
the firms in a path π when the penalty announced by the planner is p. Namely,
f(p, π) =
∑
i∈π
si(p) =
∑
i∈π:ri>p
(ri − p)Di
ri
.
Since f is a continuous strictly decreasing piecewise linear function in p from
f(0, π) =
∑
i∈π:ri>0
Di till f(p, π) = 0 when p ≥ max
i∈N
ri, there exists a unique p
1
π such
that f(p1π, π) = psπ.
By Proposition 1.1, if p < p1π for some π ∈ Π, then
∑
i∈π
si(p) > psπ and so the
project is delayed in any NE at Stage 2. We define p∗Γ = max
π∈Π
p1π. Thus,
1. If p < p∗Γ, then the project is delayed in any NE in Stage 2.
2. If p ≥ p∗Γ, since the firms play an optimal NE in Stage 2, by Proposition 1.2,
the project will finish on time. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
If p ≥ p∗Γ, by Proposition 4, we know the project finishes on time. Then, the
planner gets 0.
If p < p∗Γ, by Proposition 4, the project is delayed in any NE d(p) = (di(p))i∈N
at Stage 2. Let us make an abuse of notation and denote by di(p) the delay in the
information set of firm i achieved when firms play d(p). By the proof of Proposition
1 the planner will obtain
u0 (p, d(p)) = p
∑
i∈N
di (p)− c
(
max
π∈Π
∑
i∈π
(di(p) + ti)− T
)
= p
∑
i∈N :ri>p
Di − c
(
max
π∈Π
(
t(π) +
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di
)
− T
)
.
We decompose this utility in two parts:
p
∑
i∈N :ri>p
Di. (2)
c
(
max
π
(
t(π) +
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di
)
− T
)
. (3)
where (2) is the profit obtained from the penalties and (3) is the cost incurred by
the planner because of the delay in the project. Note that
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• The profit (2) is a right-continuous piecewise linear function on the intervals
defined by {p∗Γ, {rj : rj < p
∗
Γ}}. Within each interval this function is strictly
increasing in p.
If p ≥ ri for some i ∈ N , firm i will choose di(p) = 0 whereas di(p) = Di when
p < ri. So (2) decreases when moving from one interval to the next. Thus,
the local supremum of (2) is achieved when p left converges to an element in
{p∗Γ, {rj : rj < p
∗
Γ}}.
• The cost (3) is a decreasing piecewise constant function on the intervals given
by {p∗Γ, {rj : rj < p
∗
Γ}}. So, again, the changes in (3) are given when p ∈
{p∗Γ, {rj : rj < p
∗
Γ}}.
Thus, computing the strategy that will lead to a supremum in the planner’s utility
is straightforward. When p ≥ p∗Γ its utility will be 0 for sure.
When p < p∗Γ we only need to calculate its utility function in {p
∗
Γ, {rj : rj < p
∗
Γ}}.
Note that we talk about the supremum (rather than the maximum) because it is
achieved when the penalty left converges to some ri or to p
∗
Γ. 
Proof of Proposition 6. It is obvious that d is an NE.
Let, d′ be a profile of strategies. For each i ∈ N , ui(d
′) = (ri − p)d
′
i.
1. If ri ≤ p, then ui(d
′) ≤ 0 = ui(di, d
′
−i).
2. If ri > p, then ui(d
′) ≤ (ri − p)Di = ui(di, d
′
−i).
Now it is trivial to prove that all NE in the subgame obtained in Stage 2 have
the same utility outcome as d. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Given a penalty p, the delay of path π when the firms
play an NE is given by
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di.
For each path π such that
∑
i∈π:ri>0
Di > psπ we take p
2
π such that
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di > psπ
for each p < p2π and
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di ≤ psπ for each p ≥ p
2
π. Obviously, p
2
π ∈ {ri}i∈π .
For each path π such that
∑
i∈π:ri>0
Di ≤ psπ we take p
2
π = 0.
We define p∗∆ = max
π∈Π
{p2π}.
1. If p < p∗∆, then there exists π ∈ Π such that 0 ≤ p < p
2
π. Thus,
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di > psπ
Therefore, the project will be delayed.
2. If p ≥ p∗∆, then for each π ∈ Π, p ≥ p
2
π. Thus, for each π ∈ Π,
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di ≤ psπ
and so the project will finish on time.
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In Proposition 4 we have seen that
∑
i∈π
si(p
1
π) =
∑
i∈π:ri>p1π
si(p
1
π) = psπ.
Since si(p) ≤ Di for all p ∈ R
+,
∑
i∈π:ri>p1π
Di ≥ psπ. Thus, p
1
π ≤ p
2
π and sop
∗
Γ ≤ p
∗
∆. 
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 7,
1. If p < p∗∆ the project will be delayed and the utility of the planner will be
u0(p, d(p)) = p
∑
i∈N :ri>p
Di − c
(
max
π∈Π
(
t(π) +
∑
i∈π:ri>p
Di
)
− T
)
. (4)
2. If p ≥ p∗∆ the project will finish on time. In this case we need to distinguish
two cases:
(a) If p ≥ max {ri}i∈N , all the activities will play 0 and the utility of the
planner will be 0.
(b) If p < max {ri}i∈N , despite the project ends on time, the planner will ob-
tain some benefits through the penalties. Thus, u0(p, d(p)) = p
∑
i∈N :ri>p
Di.
Note that the function that computes the benefit obtained from penalties and
the function that computes the cost incurred by the planner if the project is delayed
are the same as in Proposition 5. So, since the changes in both functions are given
when p ∈ {ri}i∈N , the local supremum for the planner is achieved when the penalty
p left converges to a rj ∈ {ri}i∈N .
Proof of Proposition 9.
We first compute dΓ(p). We consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D). By
Proposition 2, si(p) ≤ d
Γ
i (p) ≤ Di for each i ∈ N .
• Assume that there is no NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D). By the
proof of Proposition 1.1,
dΓi (p) =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
Di if ri > p.
We now compute d∆(p). By Proposition 6,
d∆i (p) =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
Di if ri > p.
We now prove the statement of the proposition.
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1. Example 5. Let p = 2 and c = 5. Then, uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) = 0 and u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)) = 3.
If we consider c = 6, then uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) = 0 again, but u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)) = −2.
Example 3. Let p = 0.8 and c = 2. Then, uΓ0 (p, d
Γ(p)) = u∆0 (p, d
∆(p)) = 2.
2. Notice that
u∆i (p, d
∆(p)) =
{
0 if ri ≤ p
(ri − p)Di if ri > p.
We consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D).
By Proposition 2,
uΓi (p, d
Γ(p)) ≥ risi(p) ≥
{
0 if ri ≤ p
(ri − p)Di if ri > p.
• Assume that there is no NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D).
Since dΓ(p) = d∆(p) we have that for each i ∈ N, uΓi (p, d
Γ(p)) = u∆i (p, d
∆(p)).
3. Again we consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D).
Thus, T (dΓ(p)) = T ≤ T (d∆(p)).
• Assume that there is no NE without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(G, c, r,D).
Since dΓ(p) = d∆(p) we have that T (dΓ(p)) = T (d∆(p)). 
Proof of Proposition 10.
1. Two cases are possible.
(a) pΓ < p∗Γ. By the proof of Proposition 5 the project is delayed under
(pΓ, dΓ(pΓ)). Since dΓ(p) = d∆(p) when p < p∗Γ, we have that u
Γ
0
(
p, dΓ(p)
)
=
u∆0
(
p, d∆(p)
)
for any p < p∗. Thus, pΓ ≤ p∆.
(b) pΓ = p∗Γ
9. By the proof of Proposition 5 the project is not delayed under
(
pΓ, dΓ(pΓ)
)
. Hence uΓ0
(
pΓ, dΓ
(
pΓ
))
= 0 ≥ uΓ0
(
p, dΓ (p)
)
for any p < p∗Γ.
We know that uΓ0
(
p, dΓ(p)
)
= u∆0
(
p, d∆(p)
)
for any p < p∗Γ. Given p
′ =
max{rj : j ∈ N} we have that u
∆
0
(
p′, d∆ (r′)
)
= 0. Then, p∗Γ ≤ p
∆ ≤ p′.
2. Two cases are possible.
(a) pΓ < p∗Γ. We have seen that d
Γ(p) = d∆(p) when p < p∗Γ. Then,
uΓ0
(
p, dΓ(p)
)
= u∆0
(
p, d∆(p)
)
for any p < p∗Γ and hence the result holds.
9Note that the case pΓ > p∗
Γ
is not possible because pΓ is the minimum.
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(b) pΓ = p∗Γ. We have seen that sup
{
uΓ0
(
p, dΓ(p)
)
: p ≥ 0
}
= 0. Since
u∆0
(
p′, d∆(p′)
)
= 0 when p′ = max{rj : j ∈ N}, the result holds.
3. Two cases are possible.
By the proof of Proposition 6 we have that
u∆i
(
p∆, d∆(p∆)
)
=
{
0 if ri < p
∆
(
ri − p
∆
)
Di if ri ≥ p
∆.
(a) pΓ < p∗Γ. By the proof of Proposition 1 we have that
uΓi
(
pΓ, dΓ(pΓ)
)
=
{
0 if ri < p
Γ
(
ri − p
Γ
)
Di if ri ≥ p
Γ.
Since pΓ ≤ p∆, the result holds.
(b) pΓ = p∗Γ. By Proposition 2 we have that
uΓi
(
pΓ, dΓ(pΓ)
)
≥ risi(p) ≥
{
0 if ri < p
Γ
(
ri − p
Γ
)
Di if ri ≥ p
Γ.
Since pΓ ≤ p∆, the result holds.
4. In Example 8. we have that T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
= 6 > 2 = T
(
d∆(p∆)
)
.
In Example 3 we have that T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
= 10 = T
(
d∆(p∆)
)
.
Consider the project given by Example 3 where c = 2 and
activities ti Di ri
a 10 5 0
b 10 5 0
e 7 5 3
Then T
(
dΓ(pΓ)
)
= 0 < 2 = T
(
d∆(p∆)
)
. 
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